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The Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission:
The Importance of Commissioners
and Their Appointment Process1
Kimberly Lanegran
klanegra@coe.edu

In May 2013, Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
(TJRC) presented its long-delayed final report to President Uhuru
Kenyatta. In four thick volumes, the commission synthesized and
interpreted information gathered over the past four years regarding
gross human rights violations and historical injustices in Kenya. The
Report presents damning indictments of the governments led by each
of Kenya’s first three presidents, Jomo Kenyatta, the current
President’s father, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki, finding
individuals and organizations in each administration responsible for
assassinations, mass human rights violations against groups and
political opponents, as well as wide scale corruption and economic
crimes. Furthermore, it documents “state sanctioned systematic
discrimination” against women and girls.2 It recommends
prosecution of 32 named individuals; an additional 33 people should
be banned from holding public office; and government should begin
investigations into allegations against a further 229 individuals and 12
1

This paper is based on a paper presented at the International Studies Association
Annual Convention in San Diego, CA in 2012. The author gratefully acknowledges
the helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers and the financial support of
Coe College’s Edward S. Murray Memorial Research fund.
2 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report of the Truth,
Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (3 May 2013) Volume 1, vii; available
from www.tjrckenya.org. Hereafter: “Report.”
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businesses.3 Many current officials are implicated. Notably,
President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William Ruto, currently
facing prosecution by the International Criminal Court, are among
those accused of planning and financing the violence that followed
Kenya’s disputed 2007 national elections.
Many people inside and outside the truth commission feared
that a final report would never be written. A scandal surrounding the
commission’s Chairman, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, tainted its
birth, nearly destroyed it before work began, plagued it throughout its
operations, and may still diminish the commission’s impact and
tarnish its legacy. Prominent human rights groups vigorously argued
that Kiplagat himself was linked to human rights violations that the
truth commission was expected to investigate. As a result, the truth
commission lacked support and legitimacy, and was largely
incapacitated for the entire first year of its mandate.4 During the
months when the commission finally engaged in substantive hearings
and data-collection, Kiplagat stepped aside to facilitate formal
investigations into his suitability. Then, just as the writing phase was
beginning in earnest, Kiplagat claimed he had no obligation to recuse
himself and surprised the commission staff by returning to his office.
Eventually, an uneasy accommodation was reached; Ambassador
Kiplagat returned as Chairman, but he agreed to not participate in
writing the final report and would not review sections of the report in
which he had an alleged conflict of interest.5
The controversy had been so prominent that the commission
was compelled to include in its Report a lengthy section on the
“credibility and suitability of the chairperson.”6 As a result much of
the Kenyan media coverage of the Report’s release rehashed the
Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report” Volume IV,
Appendix One; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
4 Interview with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011;
Interview with Tecla Namachanja Wanjala Nairobi, Kenya June 22, 2011.
5 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report” Volume 1,
chapter 4, 139; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
6 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report” Volume 1,
chapter 4, 124-144; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
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scandal. Indeed, as many predicted, the Commission found sufficient
evidence against Ambassador Kiplagat to include him in the list of
those who should be investigated for prosecution. This drew
attention away from victims of atrocities in Kenya whose stories were
conveyed in the Report and gave fuel to those seeking to delegitimize
the commission’s conclusions and recommendations.
This cautionary tale highlights a hitherto under-examined
feature of truth commission—the importance of commissioners and
their appointment processes. Because there is so very little research
on selection processes for commissions, the advice given to leaders
establishing new commissions remains simplistic. For example, in
2011 after the government of Brazil passed legislation establishing its
National Truth Commission, the International Center on Transitional
Justice (ICTJ) advised President Dilma Rousseff “to select members
of the commission on the basis of careful, transparent consultation
with civil society, ensuring all commissioners are widely respected
and regarded as politically independent, capable and impartial.”7 But
no body of analysis explains how to design a transparent consultative
process with civil society; there is no comparative evidence yet that
demonstrates that impartial commissioners are actually best; and
there is no consensus concerning what skills or experiences make a
person a capable commissioner.
As a foray into this research agenda, this article analyzes the
process through which Bethuel Kiplagat became the chairperson of
Kenya’s truth commission to provide lessons to people designing
future truth commissions.8 I assess the state of the field concerning
best practices for appointing truth commissioners and evaluate the
degree to which Kenya’s TJRC complied with them. Second, I test
the popular perception that Bethuel Kiplagat was appointed by the
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Brazil: Six Critical Steps for Truth
Commission Success,” (September 22, 2011); available from www.ictj.org.
8 Fieldwork in Kenya was conducted in June 2011; interviews were conducted with
eight high-ranking members of the Kenyan TJRC and five leaders of human rights
organizations that worked with or criticized the truth commission. Primary
documents were provided by the truth commission and human rights
organizations.
7
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Kenyan government to undermine the truth-seeking agenda. I
conclude that a generally well-designed commissioner selection
process was followed in Kenya’s case, yet it failed to promote an
appropriate slate of candidates for the truth commission. The
evidence does not demonstrate that Kiplagat’s nomination and
appointment were part of a concerted government effort to sabotage
the truth commission. Rather, the Kibaki government’s role was
more subtle; it had opportunity to ensure that individuals with strong
human rights credentials became commissioners but lacked the desire
to do so. My main theoretical conclusion is that technical issues such
as selection processes are not an important as a broader challenge
quite well known to observers of truth commissions: political will to
support an active truth-seeking project.
What we “know” about truth commissioners
Little scholarship on commissioners—their selection processes, best
practices, experiences or impact—has been conducted, and
discussions about commissioners focus on only a few broad
questions. Should members of a commission represent specific
segments of society, or should they be neutral parties? What exactly
is the best role for commissioners? Should they be active in the
commission’s daily work or serve more like a board of directors?
Should a truth commission be led by citizens of the country or
foreign nationals or a combination of both? Consensus is, however,
coalescing around the position that a transparent consultative
selection process is best. Yet, arguments rest on anecdotal evidence
and theoretical assertions rather than systematic comparisons.
The lack of careful study of truth commissioners is
lamentable given the emerging evidence of their impact on a
commission’s success or failure. In a rare comparative study based
on interviews with former staff of truth commissions, Joanna Quinn
and Mark Freeman conclude, “Perhaps the most important task for
framers [of truth commissions] is the appointment of the
commissioners. How many people will act as commissioners? Who

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 41-71

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss3/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2015.1.3.3

4

Lanegran: Challenges of a Leadership Scandal

45 The Importance of Commissioners and Their Appointment Process

will they be, and what will be the process for their selection?”9 In its
major advisory document for post-conflict states considering
establishing truth commissions, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights notes, “Ultimately, no factor
will more define the [truth] commission than the persons who serve
as its members.”10 Priscilla Hayner, in her extensive overview of truth
commissions notes, “As the public face of the commission, the
members’ personal and political authority is critical in dealing with
recalcitrant authorities and in persuading the public to trust and
engage with the process.”11 Poor leadership by commissioners and
staff has indeed been blamed for poor investigations of crimes and
loss of donor support in a number of cases, including Haiti and Sierra
Leone.12
Overall, precious little is known about the “best practices”
for selecting appropriate commissioners or what makes a “good”
commissioner. Observers agree that it is vitally important to do this
right, but give only the most general words of advice. For example,
the ICTJ advises selecting commissioners who are neutral, enjoy the
public’s confidence in their human rights record, represent diverse
perspectives, have relevant professional experience and are able to
work full-time.13 But the broader literature offers conflicting advice.
Either pick impartial individuals (if impartiality is believed possible)
Joanna R. Quinn and Mark Freeman, “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons
Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa,”
Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003): 1128.
10 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rule-ofLaw Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions” (2006), 13; available
from www.ohchr.org.
11 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth
Commissions 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2011), 212.
12 Joanna Quinn, “Haiti’s Failed Truth Commission:
Lessons in Transitional
Justice, Journal of Human Rights 8 (2009): 265-281; Beth Dougherty, “Searching for
Answers: Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” African Studies
Quarterly 8:1 (2004): 39-56; Augustine S. J. Park, “Community-based Restorative
Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone,” Contemporary Justice Review 13:1 (2010): 95119.
13 International Center for Transitional Justice, “Truth Seeking: Elements of
Creating an Effective Truth Commission” (2013), 18; available from www.ictj.org.
9
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or pick a representative group of partial individuals who can
neutralize each other’s biases.14
A relatively weak panel of
15
commissioners can work, but an active one would be needed to
hold public hearings.16 A few foreigners on a commission might be
beneficial,17 but there is no comprehensive scholarship examining
whether they make a difference to a commission.
There is significant agreement in the literature, however, that
it is best to use a consultative process when selecting the people to
serve on a truth commission. Rather than just having a President
unilaterally appoint commissions, as Brazil’s President Rousseff was
empowered to do, a number of writers suggest that the public should
be broadly engaged in the selection process.18 The UNHCHR
Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on
Human Rights and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010), 157; M. C. W. Pinto,
“Truth and Consequences or Truth and Reconciliation? Some Thoughts on the
Potential of Official Truth Commissions,” in Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on
International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese edited by Lal Chand Vohrah, Fausto
Pocar, Yvonne Featherstone, Olivier Fourmy, Christine Graham, John Hocking
and Nicholas Robson (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 693-728;
Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick Ball, “The Truth of Truth Commissions:
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights
Quarterly 23 (2001): 17; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, “Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions”
(2006), 13; available from www.ohchr.org.
15 Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick Ball, “The Truth of Truth Commissions:
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights
Quarterly 23 (2001): 42.
16 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rule-ofLaw Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions” (2006), 14; available
from www. ohchr.org.
17 M. C. W. Pinto, “Truth and Consequences or Truth and Reconciliation? Some
Thoughts on the Potential of Official Truth Commissions,” in Man’s Inhumanity to
Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese edited by Lal Chand
Vohrah, Fausto Pocar, Yvonne Featherstone, Olivier Fourmy, Christine Graham,
John Hocking and Nicholas Robson (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003),
720; Joanna R. Quinn and Mark Freeman, “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons
Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa,”
Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003): 1128.
18 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth
Commissions 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2011), 212.
14
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advises, “Truth commissions will garner the greatest public and
international support if their members are selected through a
consultative process... [which] may include inviting nominations from
the public and forming a representative selection panel (appointed by
a variety of sectors or societal groupings) to vet the nominations and
interview the finalists, recommending the final commissioners to the
appointing authority.”19 However, in practice, while the unilateral
presidential appointment process has resulted in some inappropriate
panels of commissioners, some Presidents appointed an admirable
group of commissioners. Furthermore, some inclusive processes
have led to poor choices.
The Heads of State of Serbia, Uganda, Ghana, and Nigeria
were empowered to appoint their countries’ truth commissioners
with little input from civil society or other government bodies. At
one extreme, Yugoslavia’s Vojislav Koštunica and Uganda’s Yoweri
Museveni took the opportunity to appoint allies so as to enable
government manipulation and suppression of the truth-seeking
processes. Largely as a result, neither commission gained widespread
legitimacy or fulfilled its mandate.20 At the other extreme, even
though Ghana’s John Kufour only consulted with the advisory
Council of State and the selection process of Nigeria’s Olusegun
Obasanjo remained a mystery to even the commissioners themselves,
the individuals they appointed were all regarded as neutral and some
were highly respected in their countries.21
Although these
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rule-ofLaw Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions” (2006), 13-14; available
from www.ohchr.org.
20 Jelena Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2009), 55; Joanna R. Quinn, “Constraints: The Un-Doing of the
Ugandan Truth Commission,” Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 423.
21 Ken Agyemang Attafuah, “An Overview of Ghana’s National Reconciliation
Commission and its Relationship with the Courts,” Truth Commissions and Courts:
The Tension Between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth edited by William A.
Schabas and Shane Darcy (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 125134; Mathew Kukah, “Peace Versus Justice? A View from Nigeria,” Peace versus
Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa edited by Chandra Sriram and
Suren Pillay (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 171-186; Nneoma
19
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commissions had considerable shortcomings, the quality of the
commissioners themselves was not problematic. So a unilateral
appointment process alone does not make the selection of
appropriate commissioners impossible.
Similarly, allowing representatives from a cross-section of
society to participate does not always inoculate a selection process
against appointing a problematic panel of commissioners. As
mandated by their respective Acts, selection panels were formed to
appoint the commissioners in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Specific political parties and NGOs and religious organizations had
to be represented on the selection panels in East Timor and Sierra
Leone; in Liberia, the representative from the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) had to coordinate the selection of
“[t]hree representatives from civil society organizations, [and t]wo
representatives from political parties” to join the ECOWAS and UN
representatives on a panel to nominate commissioners.22 In each
case, the panels were directed to solicit nominations from the public,
vet candidates and recommend a short list to the head of government
for appointment. In East Timor, this process worked well
appointing seven respected, yet not necessarily prominent, individuals
with experience in human rights or religious institutions from across
the political spectrum.23 In Sierra Leone and Liberia, however, most
of the appointees lacked appropriate experience and skills. Notably,
both of these commissions lacked strong leadership, which hampered
each body’s ability to deal effectively with difficulties working with
staff, as in Sierra Leone’s case,24 or tension within the commission, as
in Liberia. Lansana Gberie noted that in Liberia, “The Chair, Jerome
V. Nwogu, Shaping Truth, Reshaping Justice: Sectarian Politics and the Nigerian Truth
Commission (New York: Lexington Books, 2007).
22 National Transitional Legislative Assembly of Liberia, “Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Liberia Mandate,” (Monrovia Liberia, May 12 2005), section 8;
available from www.trcofliberia.org/about/trc-mandate.
23 Jen Laakso, “In Pursuit and Truth, Justice and Reconciliation:
The Truth
Commissions of East Timor and South Africa,” Social Alternatives 22:2 (2003): 52.
24 International Crisis Group “Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: A Fresh Start” (20 December 2002), 6; available from www.icg.org.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 41-71
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Verdier, [was] a young activist lawyer with little political and—even
less—moral clout, both necessary for leadership of an institution of
huge potential national and international importance.”25 Clearly an
inclusive selection process alone is insufficient for ensuring that
skilled and effective commissioners are appointed.
First attempt at a truth commission for Kenya
The first serious discussions about Kenya implementing a truth
commission came at the end of President Daniel arap Moi’s tenure in
2002. After Kenya’s independence, the Kenya African National
Union (KANU) dominated under first Jomo Kenyatta and later
Daniel arap Moi. This era saw the creation of an authoritarian
government led by an imperial presidency notable for political
repression, corruption and human rights abuses. With President
Moi’s retirement and KANU’s defeat, the 2002 elections created an
opportunity for the new government to address past human rights
violations and establish new pro-human rights policies.
Hoping to signal that his administration marked the end to
past atrocities, President Mwai Kibaki and his National Rainbow
Coalition (NARC) government considered investigating past human
rights crimes.
In April 2003, the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs empowered The Task Force on the
Establishment of a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission “to
find out if a truth commission was necessary for Kenya, and, if so, to
make recommendations on the type of truth commission that ought
to be established.”26 It was chaired by Professor Makau Mutua, the
energetic chairman of the Kenya Human Rights Commission.
After extensive consultations with the public, civil society and
transitional justice experts, Mutua and his committee concluded that
Kenyans did indeed need and want a truth commission to investigate
the crimes of the Kenyatta-Moi era. It found evidence of unsolved
Lansana Gberie, “Truth and Justice on Trial in Liberia,” African Affairs 107:428
(2008):456.
26 Government of Kenya, “Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (August 26, 2003), 11; available
from www.marsgroupkenya.org.
25
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human rights violations and economic crimes that needed
investigation27 and concluded that Kenyans believed a truth
commission would benefit their country.28 In August 2003, it
submitted a comprehensive report making the case for a truth
commission and offering detailed recommendations for its structure,
mandate, and powers. The Kenyan human rights community
regarded this as exemplar work and endorsed the call for a truth
commission.
However, political machinations led the government to
abandon the truth-seeking project. It is clear that even at the Task
Force’s launch few Kenyan politicians embraced the endeavor wholeheartedly. All prominent members of NARC had at one point been
KANU members; some had just abandoned Moi earlier than others.
Task Force chairman Mutua knew at the time that a truth
commission had few advocates in NARC.29 It would be preferable to
simply claim that their government would change the status quo
without running the risk of being exposed as complicit in past
violations.
Furthermore, the ruling coalition was extremely fragile as
Mwai Kibaki’s and Raila Odinga’s camps soon were embroiled in
serious disagreements about power-sharing and constitutional
reforms. Godfrey Musila blames this fallout for destroying the
momentum behind the truth commission.30 As Kibaki and Odinga
struggled for advantage over each other, each sought alliances with
additional KANU politicians. A spokesperson of the Kenya Human
Rights Commission explains that the agenda for the truth
Government of Kenya, “Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (August 26, 2003), 21; available
from www.marsgroupkenya.org.
28 Government of Kenya, “Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (August 26, 2003), 9; available
from www.marsgroupkenya.org.
29 Makau Mutua, Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 2008), 209.
30 Godfrey Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the
Challenge of External Prescriptions,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3
(2009): 449.
27
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commission was lost in 2004 when the government embraced and
brought on board some of the KANU leaders expected to be
investigated by the truth commission.31 Politicians dropped their
lukewarm interest in a truth commission so as to not cause
embarrassment for new allies.
Establishing Kenya’s TJRC
The proposal for a truth commission lay neglected until after the
violence that followed Kenya’s elections of December 2007.
International negotiators, led by Kofi Annan, guided Kenyan
politicians and civil society in a National Dialogue and Reconciliation
Process to end the post-election violence and foster political reform,
reconciliation and justice for the country. During those negotiations,
the idea of a truth commission was resuscitated, and the parties
eventually agreed to establish the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission.
The National Rainbow Coalition had collapsed over the 2005
Constitutional referendum ending the partnership between Kibaki
and Odinga. Consequently, in the 2007 election Raila Odinga leading
the new Orange Democratic Movement ran for the Presidency
against Mwai Kibaki, leading his newly formed Party of National
Unity (PNU).32 Early results released a few days after the election
had ODM parliamentary candidates and Odinga ahead in Western
and Rift valley and the PNU gaining with results from Central Kenya
and Eastern. Yet, final results were delayed. On December 29, the
head of the election commission speculated that this delay was
caused by results “being cooked.”33 Then on December 30, he
announced suddenly that Kibaki had won, and within an hour,

Kenya Human Rights Commission Spokesperson Interview, Nairobi, Kenya June
23, 2011.
32 Peter Kagwanja and Roger Southall, “Introduction: Kenya- A Democracy in
Retreat?” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27: 3 (2009): 259-277.
33 Michael Chege, “Kenya: Back from the Brink,” Journal of Democracy 19: 4 (2008):
137.
31
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Kibaki was sworn in to a second term. The ODM, however, had
defeated PNU in the Parliamentary elections.34
Almost immediately, riots began in areas loyal to Odinga who
felt the presidency had been stolen from him. Soon, violence spread
until Kenya was in its worst crisis since the coup attempt in 1982. By
the time the mayhem ceased, more than 1000 people were killed and
more than 300,000 had fled their homes.35 Kenyans and the
international community were shocked and horrified.
Amid domestic and international calls for peace, the main
political parties entered into negotiations mediated by Kofi Annan
and others from the African Union’s Panel of Eminent Africans. On
February 1, the parties announced that they agreed to tackle four
major task at hand: achieving the immediate end to violence,
implementing “measures to address the humanitarian crisis
[principally facing displaced people], promote reconciliation, healing
and restoration,” overcoming the current political crisis concerning
the election results, and devising long-term solutions to the problems
that had ultimately given rise to the crisis.36 A February 14 agreement
put a truth commission squarely back on Kenya’s reform agenda.37
The truth commission proposal appears to have been
brought back to life by members of Annan’s negotiating team. One
high ranking member of the commission believes that Kenyan
politicians certainly would not have called for a truth-seeking project
at that time; there continued to be no political will for it.38 The
impetuous probably came from elsewhere.
Priscilla Hayner,
Dorina Bekoe, “Kenya: Setting the Stage for Durable Peace?” US Institute for
Peace Briefing (April 2008), 1; available from www.usip.org.
35 International Crisis Group, “Africa Report No. 137 Kenya in Crisis” (21
February 2008), 1; available from www. icg.org.
36 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, “On the Resolution of the Political
Crisis Annotated Agenda and Timetable,” (Nairobi, Kenya 1 February 2008);
available from www. dialoguekenya.org.
37 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, “Agenda Item Three: How to
Solve the Political Crisis,” (Nairobi, Kenya 14 February 2008); available from
www.dialoguekenya.org.
38 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Staff member B, Interview,
Nairobi, Kenya June 21 2011.
34
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cofounder of the International Center for Transitional Justice, was a
human rights advisor for Annan’s negotiating team. Two sources,
one inside Kenya’s truth commission and another in a human rights
organization, said that Hayner’s advocacy for a Kenyan truth
commission was significant in the process.
The parties agreed to form a truth commission and specified
its general features. The commission should work for two years and
issue a public report to the government regarding alleged violations
of political and economic human rights that had occurred in Kenya
from independence (December 12, 1963) through to the official end
of the post-election violence (February 28, 2008). Commissioners
from outside Kenya, selected by the African Union’s Panel of
Eminent African Personalities, would sit with a majority of domestic
commissioners who would be “chosen through a consultative
process.” The body was to be independent and fair and could issue
no blanket amnesty to perpetrators.39
Kenya’s truth commission had a number of classic features
specified in its Act.40 In order “to promote peace, justice, national
unity, healing and reconciliation,” it was mandated to establish an
accurate record of past crimes against humanity and gross human
rights violations committed by public officers as well as identify the
causes of those crimes. It could recommend prosecution of some
perpetrators and amnesty for others under limited conditions. It
could also recommend means of restitution, including reparations,
for victims. The commission should hold public hearings and
needed to publish a final report. Yet the TJRC also ventured beyond
the work of previous truth commissions. Responsible to investigate
crimes committed over a 45 year period, it had the longest temporal
jurisdiction of any commission established to date. More important
however, Kenya’s was the first truth commission mandated to
Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and
Kenya’s Crisis of Governance,” (March 2008), Annex 1 “Kenya National Dialogue
and Reconciliation, Agreement establishing a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission.” Available at: www.hrw.org.
40 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.”
Available at: www.tjrckenya.org.
39
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investigate economic crimes. The Act identifies “grand corruption
and the exploitation of natural or public resources” efforts to illegally
acquire public lands and “economic marginalization of communities”
as examples of economic crimes but does not fully define the term.41
Selecting the TJRC Commissioners
The TJRC Act (Part II section 10) stipulated a process for appointing
commissioners that complied with much of the advice in the
literature. Three of the nine commissioners would be non-citizens
selected by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities. Four of the
commissioners should have “at least fifteen years’ experience in
matters relating to human rights law;” five “shall have knowledge of
and experience in forensic audit, investigations, psycho-sociology,
anthropology and social relations, conflict management, religion or
gender issues.” All had to be “impartial in the performance of the
functions of the Commission... [and] generally enjoy the confidence
of the people of Kenya.” As a whole, “the Commission shall, as
much as practicable, be balanced, representative of Kenyan society,
perceived to be impartial in its collectivity and of diverse professional
and religious backgrounds.” Furthermore, each commissioner should
be “of good character and integrity” and have “not in any way been
involved, implicated, linked or associated with human rights
violations of any kind or in any matter which is to be investigated
under this Act.”42 This final requirement proved the most difficult to
meet.
The Panel of Eminent African Personalities was free to
devise its own selection process while the procedures for appointing
the six Kenyans were laid out in detail. A nine person Selection
Panel was to be formed out of representatives of specific religious,
legal and professional organizations.43 The Act stipulated that the
Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” Part
II,6,n-p; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
42 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” Part
II,10. Available at: www.tjrckenya.org.
43
The Act explicitly identified the organizations to be represented on the
committee to select the commissioners (Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice
41
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selection panel work within a very tight timeframe. Within two
weeks of the commencement of the Act, the panel had to be formed
and publically advertise for nominations for commissioners to be
submitted during a three week period. The Selection Panel had only
seven days to consider the nominees and submit to the National
Assembly a ranked list of fifteen qualified individuals; the National
Assembly would pass along six for the President to appoint.
President Kibaki could appoint the chairperson from among the six.
Overall, the Act required the National Assembly and the President to
“have regard to gender equity and regional balance” when
nominating and appointing commissioners.44 Thus, an inclusive
consultative selecting process was devised.
Indeed that process was closely followed. The Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights held workshops for the
organizations required to participate in the selection panel to
familiarize them with the TJRC legislation and truth commissions in
general.45 Once the Act came into force in March 2009, a selection
and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” Part II,9). Two panelists had to be nominated by a
joint forum comprising the Kenya Episcopal Conference, National Council of
Churches of Kenya, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, the Hindu Council of Kenya,
the Seventh Day Adventist Church and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims.
One person had to be nominated by the Law Society of Kenya. Another had to be
nominated by Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers. The Central Organization of
Trade Unions and the Kenya National Union of Teachers had to jointly nominate
another panelist. Another had to come from the Association of Professional
Societies of East Africa. Another would be nominated by the Kenya National
Commission on Human Rights. The Kenya Private Sector Alliance and Federation
of Kenya Employers would jointly nominate one panelist. The final one would be
nominated by the Kenya Medical Association. The Chairperson of the selection
committee was from the Association of Professional Societies in East Africa. His
deputy was from the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. The
Secretary was from the Law Society of Kenya (Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation,
“Minister names members of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission”
March 16, 2009).
44 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008 First
Schedule: Procedure for Appointing Commissioners” 7.
Available at:
www.tjrckenya.org.
45 ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Interview, Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011.
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committee was quickly formed with the proscribed membership.
The week after nominations closed was very hectic. Of the nearly
250 people nominated, the Selection Panel interviewed 47.46 It ranked
fifteen candidates to send to the National Assembly. The
Departmental Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs trimmed the
list to nine: (in rank order) Bethuel Kiplagat, Thomas Letangule,
Margaret Shava, Tom Ojienda, Timothy Njoya, Betty Murungi,
Abubakar Zein, Techla Namachanja Wanjala and Ahmed Sheikh.47
The House approved this list and passed it on to the President to
select the final six. In late July 2009 the commissioners were
announced. President Kibaki appointed Bethuel Kiplagat chairman
of the TJRC; his deputy was Betty Murungi. The other Kenyan
commissioners were Techla Namachanja Wanjala, Tom Ojienda,
Margaret Shava, and Ahmed Sheikh. The Eminent Persons had
selected Judge Gertrude Chawatama (Zambia), Ambassador Berhanu
Dinka (Ethiopia) and Professor Ron Slye (USA).
Immediately, people expressed dissatisfaction about the panel
of commissioners. The international figures were unknown to
Kenyans. Some groups were unimpressed by a number of the
Kenyan nominees and some felt it was inappropriate for Ahmed
Sheikh, as a retired military officer, to serve. However, none of those
complaints compared to the uproar against the appointment of
Bethuel Kiplagat as chairman. A selection process that appeared
designed to engender the greatest possible legitimacy to the panel of
commissioners had instead created a debacle.
Scandal surrounding Chairman Kiplagat
Within a week of the announcement of Kiplagat’s appointment, there
were complaints in the press that he did not meet the selection
criterion of not having been “involved, implicated, linked or
Chairperson of the selection panel quoted in Sarah Wambui, “Experts say Kenya
Truth Process on Track,” CaptialFM (Feb 11, 2010); available from
www.capitalfm.co.ke.
47 Kenyan National Assembly, “Adoption of Report on Nomination of
Commissioners to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission” (25 June
2009).
46
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associated with human rights violations of any kind or in any matter
which is to be investigated” by the TJRC.48 Four arguments were
made against his appointment. First, some felt that simply as a
former high-ranking member of President Moi’s government, he
could not lead a truth-seeking effort into violations committed by
that government.49 The Muslim Human Rights Forum, for example,
called for his removal even before his swearing in because he was “an
insider in the administration of former President Moi at critical
moments of gross human rights violations which will be subjects of
inquiry by the TJRC.”50
Furthermore, Kiplagat was already personally associated with
two prominent crimes which the truth commission would have to
investigate if it hoped to be seen as credible. One was the infamous
“Wagalla Massacre” of 1984 during which government forces
rounded up thousands of ethnic Somalis, detained them without food
or water at an airstrip for days and slaughtered hundreds. It was
arguably the single worst human rights atrocity of independent
Kenya. Yet very little is publicly known about who ordered the
action, and victims and survivors await justice. There is evidence that
Bethuel Kiplagat was present at a meeting of the local District
Security Committee a few days before the security operation in
Wagalla began.51 Therefore, some allege that he has information
about the planning of the massacre. At the very least, many expected
that the commission would have to interview Kiplagat.
Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.”
Section 10. Available at: www.tjrckenya.org.
49 Bethuel Kiplagat joined the Kenyan government in 1978 and held various foreign
affairs posts including Kenya’s Ambassador to France, High Commissioner to
Great Britain, and Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He left
government in 1991 and served on a number of boards including that of the
Nairobi Stock Exchange. He became active in regional peace negotiations serving
as Kenya’s Special Envoy to Somalia 2003-2005. He served on the board of the
International Crisis Group for two years starting in 2004.
50 Catholic Information Service for Africa, “Religion; Muslim Human Rights
Forum Rejects Kiplagat” (July 28, 2009); available from www. lexisnexis.com.
51 S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984 (Nairobi, Kenya:
Northern Publishing House, 2007), 20.
48
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The other case concerned the murder of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko, in 1990 when Kiplagat was the
Permanent Secretary in Ouko’s Ministry. This assassination is
arguably Kenya’s greatest unsolved murder despite being the subject
of one trial and three separate government inquiries. Some evidence
suggests that individuals in Moi’s inner circle were responsible for the
murder.52 Indeed, Kiplagat had served as a witness for each of the
governmental inquiries into Ouko’s death. Most problematic for
Kiplagat’s appointment to the truth commission, the 2005 report of
the Parliamentary Select Committee’s investigation in Ouko’s death
noted that an earlier investigation had concluded that Kiplagat was
untruthful in his statements.
Therefore, the parliamentary
committee in 2005 had recommended further investigation into what
Kiplagat knew about Ouko’s assassination.53 Here was another case
in which he would be a necessary witness in a case Kenyans expected
the TJRC to investigate. Critics argued that the chairman testifying
before his own commission would render the TJRC an illegitimate
farce.
The final argument against Kiplagat’s suitability as a
commissioner points out that he had already been identified as
personally responsible for violating the economic rights of Kenyan
citizens. The 2004 report by the government’s Commission of
Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (the
Ndung’u Report) concluded that Ambassador Kiplagat had illegally
or irregularly acquired three specific parcels of land.54 Specifically
52 Smith Hempstone,
Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (Sewanee, TN:
University of the South Press, 1997), chapter 5.
53Kenya Human Rights Commission, “The Position of the KHRC on the
Credibility of Bethuel Kiplagat, the Chair of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission” (17 February 2010). On file with author.
54 Kenya Human Rights Commission, “The Position of the KHRC on the
Credibility of Bethuel Kiplagat, the Chair of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission” (17 February 2010).
On file with author;
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Kenya: Truth Commission Chair
Should Step Down” (22 February 2010); available from www.ictj.org; Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, “A Petition from the Commissioners of
the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya Pursuant to Section 17
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mandated to investigate economic crimes and make
recommendations concerning the implementation of previous reports
like the Ndung’u Report, the TJRC would have been expected to
directly investigate the actions of its own chairperson.
Impact of the scandal
One insight the Kenyan case offers to theoretical conceptions of
truth commissions is the central importance of earning legitimacy in
the eyes of civil society organizations and maintaining their support.
Many Kenyan human rights organizations became distrustful of the
TJRC and demanded that Kiplagat step down. Some groups
concluded that the entire TJRC was irretrievably tainted and refused
to work with it and/or called for it to disband. Consequently, public
opinion turned against the commission, the TJRC could not count on
the assistance of civil society organizations to facilitate its fundraising
efforts, investigations, and public awareness campaigns, and the
Kenyan government and foreign donors declined to adequately fund
the commission. Eventually, the commission itself turned to
desperate steps and asked the government to investigate whether
Kiplagat should be removed from office. Ultimately, the entire first
year of the truth commission’s two-year mandate was effectively
wasted due to the accusations against Kiplagat.
To many human rights groups, Kiplagat’s appointment as
chairman looked like the government’s attempt to sabotage the truthseeking agenda and shield those in power from close scrutiny.55 In
February 2010, calls for Kiplagat’s resignation reached a fever pitch.
The Kenya Human Rights Commission concluded that Kiplagat
“falls short of the qualifications of the chair” as stipulated by the Act

and Section 10 of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act No.6 of 2008, as
Amended” (April 2010); available from www.tjrckenya.org.
55Interview with International Centre for Policy and Conflict spokesperson,
Nairobi, Kenya June 22, 2011; Interview with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson,
Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011.
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and demanded his resignation.56 Eight Kenyan human rights groups
issued a similar joint press statement.57 Ten former members of
other truth commissions, including South Africa’s Archbishop
Desmond Tutu and four other past chairmen, also called on Kiplagat
to leave the TJRC citing the allegations of his inability to be impartial
in important areas of the commission’s work.58
Going further, some organizations and individuals argued
that the truth commission was too discredited and flawed to be
allowed to go forward. Kenyans Against Impunity, in September
2009 called for the commission’s disbanding citing Chairman
Kiplagat as one of the reasons.59 Makau Mutua repeatedly called for
the TRJC to fold. Even in June 2011, when the TJRC had started
hearings and Kiplagat had stepped down, a few prominent human
rights activists privately said that they personally felt the TJRC’s
continued lack of credibility meant it would best for it to be
disbanded and reconstituted.60
However, Kenya’s civil society is not homogenous, and
organizations had fluid and varying relationships with the TJRC.
Individual groups made their own calculations about whether and
how to work with the truth commissions, and those decisions also
shifted over time.61 FIDA-Kenya, The Catholic Peace and Justice
Committee and the Kenya National Human Rights Commission are
among the groups that offered legal assistance and civic education,
Kenya Human Rights Commission, “The Position of the KHRC on the
Credibility of Bethuel Kiplagat, the Chair of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission” (17 February 2010). On file with author.
57 International Centre for Policy and Conflict, “Press statement: Impunity-Free
TJRC Bogged by Chair’s Credibility Crisis,” (7 February 2010). On file with
author.
58 Capital FM radio (Kenya), “Archbishop Tutu, Others Urge Head of Kenyan
Truth Panel to Quit,” February 25 2010; available from www.lexisnexis.com.
59 Kenyans Against Impunity, “Why We Reject the TJRC as Formed and
Composed,” September 3, 2009. On file with author.
60 Interviews with representative of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011 and representative of International Center for Policy
and Conflict Nairobi, Kenya June 22, 2011.
61 Interview with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011.
56
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and identified and prepared witnesses to testify at hearings.62 The
International Committee of Jurists and the International Centre on
Peace and Conflict, systematically observed the hearings, but did not
actively assist the commission.
As accusations against Chairman Kiplagat increased, he grew
less popular with Kenyans. A March 2010 survey showed that the
public was divided about whether Kiplagat should stay on as
chairman. A full 30% of those surveyed didn’t know who the chair
of the TJRC was. Of those who could identify him, 49% wanted
Kiplagat to remain chair while 41% wanted him to resign.63
The scandal surrounding the chairman also exacerbated the
severe funding problems hampering the TJRC. Originally, the
commission proposed a total budget of $27 million (approx. 2.4
billion Kenya shillings) for its two years of work.64 Yet for fiscal year
2010-11 the Kenyan government agreed to give the commission 16%
of the funds requested to be distributed in three installments.65 The
resulting cash flow problems required supplemental government
funding and increased the necessity of additional financial support
from donors. International donors, however, largely refused to fund
the commission. In its 2011 progress report, the truth commission
concluded that “the controversy that surrounded the suitability of its
Chairperson” was one of the main reasons why donors were
unwilling to support it.66

Interviews with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011 and
Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission staff member A, Nairobi,
Kenya June 20, 2011.
63 Samwel Kumba, “Kiplagat Row Splits Locals,” The Nation (Nairobi) March 30,
2010; available from www.lexisnexis.com.
64 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the
National Assembly,”(24 June 2011), 39; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
65 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), 39; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
66 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), 38; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
62
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Efforts to resolve the crisis
In April 2010, the commissioners asked Chief Justice Evan Gicheru
to begin the process to determine whether Kiplagat should be
removed from the commission. That same month Betty Murungi,
the commissioner with the most credibility among the Kenyan
human rights community, resigned her seat. Yet the government did
not move expeditiously to address Kiplagat’s case. In October,
Commissioner Ron Slye, the most visible international commissioner,
announced his intension to resign citing his belief that the
commission could not complete its mandate under Kiplagat’s
leadership. However, before Slye’s resignation came into effect, the
government announced that it would investigate Kiplagat’s
appointment, so Slye remained. On November 2, Kiplagat stepped
aside from day to day work of the commission, and the Chief Justice
appointed the Tribunal. The TJRC soon received an extension to its
two-year mandate and, for the next 16 months, worked without
Ambassador Kiplagat in office.
Yet, the Tribunal’s work was halted when Kiplagat instigated
a legal case against it; at issue was its mandate. According to the
TJRC’s founding legislation, a Tribunal could remove a
commissioner on the grounds of “misbehavior or misconduct” while
serving. Initially, the commission asked Chief Justice Gicheru to
investigate whether Ambassador Kiplagat was in violation of the Act
when he submitted to the selection committee, and then maintained
while chairman, that he was not “involved, implicated, linked or
associated with human rights violations” likely to come before the
commission.67 However, the Chief Justice mandated a Tribunal in
November 2010 to investigate “the allegations that the said
Chairman’s past conduct erodes and compromises his legitimacy and
credibility to chair the Commission.” 68 Ambassador Kiplagat
immediately filed an application first before the Tribunal and then the
Kenya Truth, Justice and
chapter 4, 128; available from
68 Kenya Truth, Justice and
chapter 4, 130; available from
67

Reconciliation Commission, “Report”
www.tjrckenya.org.
Reconciliation Commission, “Report”
www.tjrckenya.org.

Volume I
Volume I
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High Court challenging investigations into his conduct prior to
becoming Chairman.
The High Court halted the work of the Tribunal but not the
countdown on its 6 month mandate while the court considered
Kiplagat’s case. Then, when the Tribunal’s mandate expired before
the High Court case heard statements, Kiplagat withdrew his case
against the Tribunal. As a result, the High Court never had
opportunity to rule on whether the Chief Justice’s Tribunal had been
properly constituted, and the Tribunal itself never pronounced
whether Kiplagat was guilty of misbehavior and misconduct or had
conflicts of interest with his commission.
There was also a concurrent case that muddied the legal
issues at least as perceived by some in the public. A lobby group
Kenyans Against Impunity began separate proceedings against the
commission asserting that the selection process laid out by the Act
had not been followed and that Kiplagat’s oath of office had not
been properly administered.69 In November 2011, a three judge
panel that found that the composition and work of the selection
panel and the administration of the oaths of office had been
procedurally correct according to law. Furthermore, it determined that
the court was not the appropriate venue for the applicants to seek the
removal of Kiplagat on the merit of his appointment and noted that
the Chief Justice’s Tribunal had been established. Therefore this case
against the TJRC and Kiplagat was dismissed. However, many in the
press and Kiplagat himself interpreted this as clearing him of all
allegations.70
In the meantime, Ambassador Kiplagat had been called to
testify to the truth commission as a person “named adversely” by
many witnesses who gave statements regarding the Wagalla Massacre.
His description of the TJRC as “his commission” at the time, led
reporters and civil society groups to questioned his precise official
Kenya High Court, “Republic v Truth Justice & Reconciliation Commission &
another Ex-parte Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 others” [Kenya High Court Misc
App. No 470 of 2009]; available from www.kenyalaw.org.
70 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”
Volume I
chapter 4, 150; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
69
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role. The commission also made plans to call Kiplagat to testify as
“an adversely mentioned person with respect to irregular land
acquisition and the assassination of the Honourable Dr. Robert
Ouko.”71
Then in January 2012 Kiplagat unexpectedly returned to the
Commission offices, demanded access to the office of the Acting
Chairperson and told the press that he was “back with a bang.”72 He
argued that because there were no active legal cases against him he
should return to work. With critics once again up in arms against
Kiplagat, questioning the TJRC’s neutrality and demonstrating
outside their offices, the remaining commissioners initially refused to
work with Kiplagat and sought recourse in the courts. They asked
the Kenyan High Court to forbid Ambassador Kiplagat to return to
work until a Tribunal had addressed the allegations concerning his
suitability. Furthermore, they asked the High Court to order the
current Chief Justice Willy Mutunga to create such a Tribunal in
accordance with the TJRC Act.73 However, Justice Mohamed
Warsame ruled against the commission, and Chief Justice Mutunga
refused to (re)constitute a tribunal.74
Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report” Volume I
chapter 4, 138; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
72 Wahome Thuku, “Kiplagat back at Truth Commission,” The Standard (January 17
2012).
73Kenya High Court, “ Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission v the Chief
Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Bethuel Kiplagat” Judicial Case No 7 of 2012.
(February 24, 2012); available from www.kenyalaw.org.
74 Justice Warsame’s ruling and the Commission’s argument are confusing. See
Kenya High Court, “Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission v the Chief
Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Bethuel Kiplagat” Judicial Case No 7 of 2012.
(February 24, 2012); available from www.Kenyalaw.org. The Commission’s lawyers
appear to have asked that the Court order the Chief Justice to establish a new
tribunal with a mandate similar to the first one i.e. to investigate “the allegations
that the past conduct of [Mr. Kiplagat] erodes and compromises his legitimacy and
credibility to chair” (p. 4) rather than the narrower language of the TJRC’s original
petition to the Chief Justice to investigate whether Kiplagat’s maintenance of his
sworn affidavit, that he was not linked to any violations to come before the
commission, was misconduct. Justice Warsame determined that the Chief Justice
would have no power to appoint a tribunal to investigate a commissioner’s past
71
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The impasse was finally broken via negotiations made
possible by the Ministry of Justice and Kenya’s Commission on
Administrative Justice. In April 2012, Chairman Kiplagat and the
other commissioners agreed that he would return the TJRC but
would not be involved writing the final report. He could review the
final report, but an Aide Memoire specified that he would not be able
to review parts of the Report “concerning massacres, political
assassinations, and land” and would have the same rights and
opportunities as adversely mentioned persons, to make his case
before the commission.75 The Commission pledged upon the release
of its Report that it “can categorically state the final drafts of the
chapters of the Report dealing with land, political assassinations, and
massacres were drafted without any input or influence by Kiplagat”
and that he was given the opportunity to “write a response or
dissenting opinion.”76
Kiplagat chose to dissent in the press. Only, a few days after
handing the report to President Uhuru Kenyatta, the Chairman stood
before reporters criticizing some of the commission’s methods,
findings, and powers. He said, “If you read on Ouko, Wagalla and
land, findings and recommendations do not tally... the commission
will have a difficult time proving their case in court in case some of
the accused take legal action... You cannot just hand over a report
and say prosecute.”77 Thus, the scandal surrounding the
Commission’s leadership continues to undermine Kenya’s truthseeking efforts.
behavior and therefore would not order the Chief Justice to do so (pp.14-16).
Furthermore, Justice Warsame apparently referring to the Kathangu v TJRC High
Court ruling, determined that “the controversy once settled by the authoritative
decision of the High Court should not be re-opened unless there are extraordinary
reasons for doing so” and implied that this was “frivolous and vexatious” litigation
created by “meddlesome interlopers” (pp.16-17).
75 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”
Volume I
chapter 4, Appendix 10, 212; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
76 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”
Volume I
chapter 4, 141; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
77 Capital FM (Nairobi) “Kiplagat Doubts TJRC Report Will Pass the Test of
Time” May 23 2013; available from www.allafrica.com.
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How did this happen?
Some Kenyans believe that Bethuel Kiplagat was appointed
chairperson of the TJRC to allow the tradition of impunity to
continue to pollute their country.78
However, the evidence
undermines this hypothesis in three ways. First, it was civil society
organizations themselves who led the selection process that
recommended that the President name Kiplagat to the commission.
Second, while chairman, Kiplagat did not support the government’s
most prominent attempt to co-opt the truth commission. Finally, the
government’s pattern of granting funds and extensions to the TJRC
and participating in its legal wrangling is more indicative of
uncertainty over what do so with the commission rather than a
concerted plan to support Kiplagat’s chairmanship.
Consequently, I hypothesize that the most plausible
explanation for this debacle is that President Kibaki, lukewarm to the
entire truth-seeking project at best, took advantage of the
opportunity handed to him, not created by him, to appoint a
controversial chairman. Although there is no evidence that Kiplagat
agreed to try to protect government officials from the commission’s
investigations, it likely comforted Kibaki to have a chairperson who
was not a political outsider. Furthermore, it served the government’s
interest, and is in keeping with Kibaki’s decision-making style, to
launch a flawed commission and let it flounder, hopefully to
eventually capsize.
The opportunity to undermine the truth commission was
provided by the inattentive work of the Selection Committee.
Bethuel Kiplagat’s candidacy was initiated and supported by peace
sector civil society groups. The National Council of Churches of
Kenya initially nominated him; Kiplagat had previously served as the
Council’s Deputy General Secretary.79
After leaving Moi’s
government, Kiplagat had been active in regional peace-keeping
initiatives and had denounced Kenya’s post-election violence. At the
Interview with International Centre for Policy and Conflict spokesperson,
Nairobi, Kenya June 22, 2011.
79 Sarah Wambui, “Kenyan Lawyer Faults Tutu on TJRC,” Capital FM (February
26, 2010); available from www.capitalfm.co.ke.
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time of nomination, he was Executive Director of Africa Peace
Forum.
Struggling to evaluate the approximately 250 nominees in the
allowed week, the Selection Committee failed to adequately vet the
finalists. One member Florence Simbi-Jaoko explained that the
selection committee “relied on an affidavit in which we asked those
we interviewed to swear that their past was clean.”80 So even though
it was mandated that a commissioner not be implicated or associated
with any human rights violation, the selection committee conducted
no independent background checks of nominees. Another member
Isaiah Kubai explained later that he felt it had not been the
responsibility of the Panel to investigate candidates’ past because that
should have been Parliament’s obligation.81 Their colleague, Evans
Monari said that none of the criticisms of Kiplagat found in the press
after his appointment were brought to the attention of the Selection
Panel.82 In the end, the Selection Panel placed Kiplagat among the
fifteen recommended nominees and ranked him near the top.
President Kibaki had even less interest in setting up a
vigorous truth commission in 2008 than he had been in 2003 when
he shelved the recommendations of the Mutua Task Force. This new
truth commission had a mandate to move beyond the Kenyatta-Moi
years to investigate more recent human rights and economic crimes
of the new administration as well as the post-election violence
committed by supporters of both presidential candidates. Therefore,
few politicians would enthusiastically welcome an active independent
truth commission. So when President Kibaki was given an
opportunity to select a chairperson who was a seasoned politician
with professional and personal ties to government, it is not surprising
that he appointed the former ambassador to the chair while two
highly respected prominent clergymen with no previous ties to the
Samwel Kumba, “Kenya: Truth Team Selection Panel on the Spot,” Daily Nation
(February 26, 2010); available from www.allafrica.com.
81 Samwel Kumba, “Kenya: Truth Team Selection Panel on the Spot,” Daily Nation
(February 26, 2010); available from www.allafrica.com.
82 Sarah Wambui, “Kenyan Lawyer Faults Tutu on TJRC,” Capital FM (February
26, 2010); available from www.capitalfm.co.ke.
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government would be left off the commission entirely. One does not
have to go so far as to believe in collusion between Kiplagat and the
Kibaki government to see why Kiplagat might have been preferred.
Another reason to discount the grand conspiracy thesis is that
under Kiplagat’s leadership, the TJRC commissioners publicly
resisted the government over a proposed change to their mandate,
which overlapped with other judicial efforts to prosecute those most
responsible for human rights crimes during Kenya’s post-election
violence. Agreements made during Kenya’s National Dialogue also
obliged the government to prosecute people responsible for postelection crimes. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-election
Violence (the Waki Commission) in October 2008 announced that it
had evidence that a number of prominent individuals, whom it did
not name, should be prosecuted for alleged crimes surrounding the
election. In July 2009, when the Kenyan government declined to
establish appropriate trials for those individuals, their names were
handed over to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
(ICC).83
Although Kenyan authorities had failed to establish a local
tribunal to try people implicated in the post-election violence, many
politicians regard an ICC case as an even more dangerous alternative.
Therefore, in a last ditch effort, Kibaki announced that his cabinet
was considering expanding the mandate the TJRC to include
investigations of those suspected of post-election violence.84 This
infuriated critics who accused the government of working to
maintain the impunity of prominent suspects. Dr. Makau Mutua, for
In December 2010 ICC prosecutor announced charges against six suspects in
this case—William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang (then
allied with Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement and Francis Kirimi Muthaura,
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and Mohamed Hussein Ali (allied with Kibaki’s Party of
National Unity)—for their alleged responsibility in the commission of crimes
against humanity. All six first appeared before the court in April 2011, but the
cases against all but Ruto, Arap Sang and Kenyatta were dropped. In 2013, Uhuru
Kenyatta was elected President of Kenya and William Ruto became Vice-President.
All three cases continue before the ICC.
84 BBC Monitoring Africa, “Kenyan Cabinet Opts for Truth Body to Deal with
Post-Poll Crimes,” (July 30, 2009); available from www.lexisnexis.com.
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example, wrote a blistering editorial directly accusing the government
of appointing Kiplagat chair of the commission so that it could move
the post-election violence suspects over to its jurisdiction and then
shield them from harsh scrutiny and punishment.85
Mr. Kiplagat’s actions, however, do not suggest that he had
agreed to collude with the government over the truth commission’s
agenda and work. Rather he joined the other commissioners in
vehemently rejecting the proposal. They wrote to the Minister for
Justice and Constitutional Affairs to express their firm objection, and
Ambassador Kiplagat told the press that they were all prepared to
resign if the proposal went forward.86 It did not.
Furthermore, the pattern of government funding of the TJRC
does not suggest the existence of a concerted strategy to back a
purposely co-opted commission under Kiplagat. If the Kenyan
government had plotted to establish a weak truth commission led by
a “plant,” then it seems logical that it would have been more
generous with its funds when Kiplagat led the commission as
opposed to after he had stepped down. Instead the opposite
happened. As noted above, the TJRC repeatedly approached the
government for supplemental allocations both before and shortly
after Ambassador Kiplagat stepped aside in November 2010. The
precarious funding situation was finally alleviated in April 2011 when
the government gave the commission an award more than twice the
size of its initial pledge to the commission under Kiplagat’s
leadership.87
There is no obvious straightforward interpretation of this
funding pattern.
Many factors extraneous to the Kenyan
government’s desires for the truth commission surely impact its
budgetary decisions. However, it does not clearly support the
conspiracy argument that Kenyan authorities planned to use Kiplagat
The Nation (Nairobi), “Nothing Could Be More Insulting to Kenyans,”( August
2, 2009); available from www.lexisnexis.com.
86 BBC Monitoring Africa, “Chair of Kenya’s Truth Commission Defies Cabinet
over Mandate,” (August 20, 2009); available from www.lexisnexis.com.
87 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), 40. Available: www.tjrckenya.org.
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to undermine the truth seeking agenda. There are some who say that
the reason the government was not more generous to the Kiplagatled commission was that it feared that Kiplagat would soon have to
leave the post.88 According to this interpretation, the government
didn’t want to get the commission on solid ground only to then lose
its friendly chairman. But if a conspiracy was afoot, the government
would have felt more confident working with a commission led by
Kiplagat as opposed to an uncertain future of a commission with
another chairperson. It seems more logical to try to get a friendly
truth commission up and running and over with quickly so as to
complete that obligation as painlessly as possible. Furthermore, the
conspiracy interpretation cannot explain why the government was
comparatively more generous funding the commission once
Namachanja Wanjala became Acting Chairperson.
This funding pattern suggests that the government was
willing to allow the commission process to make its own mistakes,
support it as little as possible and respond to opportunities and
demands as they evolved. It is clear that the government did not
want a vigorous truth commission so they funded it poorly and
hoped to watch it fade away or self-destruct under Kiplagat.
However, when the commission did not implode and managed to
demonstrate that Kenyans wanted the process to continue, the
Kenyan government released more funds.
Conclusion
The near death experience of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission brought on by the scandal surround the
appointment of Bethuel Kiplagat as its chairperson offers three main
lessons to inform those establishing future truth commissions. First,
as important as it is to establish a selection process designed to
achieve the greatest possible legitimacy the truth-seeking body,
excellent plans are only as good as the work of people who
implement them. Second, in a context of limited government
88
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support for a truth commission, any error in the selection process
that might jeopardize a truth commission may be utilized by its
opponents in government. It does not take government subterfuge
to undermine a truth commission; insufficient will to protect it from
errors can be adequate. Finally, the practical lesson that comes from
this case is to allocate sufficient time for the selection process to
unfold and provide transparency so that candidate commissioners
can be carefully vetted. Do not assume that a process implemented
by civil society will ensure that appropriate commissioners are
selected. In this case, once civil society organizations hurriedly put
forward a panel of possible commissioners that included a candidate
likely to keep the commission from gaining credibility, the Kibaki
government declined to protect the truth commission from this
error.
On a positive note, the Kenyan TJRC did eventually issue a
commendable report. The commission staffed worked in extremely
difficult and uncertain circumstances, at times without pay, to press
for a solution to the problem of their chairman, creatively seek allies
and demonstrate what the truth commission could achieve for
Kenyans. Their work was facilitated and buoyed up by a second
factor—Kenyans’ willingness to participate in the truth-seeking
project.
Even when the truth commission’s fate was far from
certain, over 30,000 individuals submitted statements concerning
crimes in Kenya’s past, which is the largest number of statements
received to date by any truth commission.89 Furthermore, in 2011
when the TJRC began its public hearing phase, people turned out in
large numbers to testify and listen. There was heart-rending
testimony given at well-attended early hearings in North Eastern
Province and in Mt. Elgon, which demonstrated popular desire for
truth-seeking and justice. Nongovernmental organizations responded
to the evidence of popular interest and began to give more support to
the truth commission, and the TJRC persevered.
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), iii; available from www.tjrckenya.org.
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